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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is the fourth installment in this lengthy and 
tortuous insurance saga. The case has come back to us 
after we dismissed it because the district court had not 
adjudicated all the claims in one of the actions in the 
consolidated case. The district court has since issued an 
order dismissing all ERISA claims, denying appellant's 
petition for a declaratory judgment, and entering final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. We will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 
I. 
 
The Lake Erie Employers' Association ("LEEA") was 
formed in September 1981 as a non-profit corporation with 
the stated purpose of "foster[ing] and promot[ing] the 
mutual interests of those individuals, partnerships,firms, 
associations, and corporations who are engaged in business 
in the Northwestern Pennsylvania Area" and "foster[ing] and 
advanc[ing] a mutual cooperation and understanding 
among such businesses with the other economic entities 
affecting business in the area." See LEEA Certificate of 
Incorporation, at A65. "Any individual, partnership, firm, 
association, or corporation . . . engaged in business in the 
Northwestern Pennsylvania area employing at leastfive (5) 
but less than 150 employees and who is interested in the 
purposes of the organization" could apply for membership 
in the association.1 LEEA Bylaws Art. IV, P 1, at A72. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Bylaws were amended on April 25, 1983, to permit businesses 
employing up to 225 employees to apply for membership. See A103-04. 
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Associate membership was available for businesses having 
"a demonstrable material interest in the purposes of the 
organization" but not meeting the membership criteria. Id. 
P 3, at A72. 
 
LEEA was the brainchild of J. Patrick Karle, one of the 
principals of the brokerage firm Hubbard Bert Karle Weber, 
Inc. ("HBKW"). Karle, who also served as President and 
Chairman of the Board of LEEA, testified that the idea for 
LEEA arose when HBKW observed the success that large 
employers had with self-funded health and benefit plans, 
and concluded that it might be possible for smaller 
employers to enjoy the same success with a self-funded 
alternative if they banded together. Karle Dep. of Oct. 7, 
1986, at A743-44. He testified that LEEA was formed both 
to provide small businesses with an alternative health 
benefit option to that available from Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
and to serve as a forum where small business people could 
obtain information about changes in the laws and 
regulations governing employee benefits. Id. at A751. 
Toward the latter purpose, LEEA published a newsletter, 
approximately on a quarterly basis, that discussed changes 
in benefits law and provisions, as well as other matters that 
might be of interest to a small business person, such as tax 
and estate law. In addition, the association held two 
meetings a year at which legislators and other speakers 
would discuss topics of interest to the members or local 
health care providers would describe "wellness programs" 
that could assist the employers in the cost-effective 
provision of health benefits to their employees. 
 
Despite its informational activities, it is clear that LEEA's 
primary purpose was the provision of health and other 
benefits to the employees of its employer-members. The 
first order of business, after incorporation and the 
appointment of officers and directors, engaged in by the 
Board of Directors of LEEA was "a discussion of the need 
to provide self-insured health benefits and dental benefits 
for members of [LEEA]" and resolutions"to establish one or 
several health, dental, and such other benefit plans which 
shall be offered to the members of this corporation in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York states" and to establish 
"the [LEEA] Benefit Trust and the [LEEA] Accident and 
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Health Plan" effective November 1, 1981. Minutes of 
Meeting of Oct. 8, 1981, at A110-11. In addition, a review 
of those minutes of later Board meetings that are provided 
in the record reveals that discussion at the meetings 
centered almost exclusively on matters related to the 
various benefit plans administered by LEEA, including plan 
amendments, rate and billing adjustments, and collection 
procedures. In addition, there is no indication in the record 
that LEEA had any members that were not also 
participants in the LEEA Plan. Indeed, although "[a]ll 
proceedings in relation to membership applications [were] 
secret and confidential," LEEA Amended Bylaws, Art. V, 
P 2, at A89, there is an implication in the record that 
membership decisions were based on underwriting 
considerations. 
 
It is also clear that LEEA and HBKW, the brokeragefirm, 
were closely interrelated. As we have noted, the idea for 
LEEA came from an HBKW principal. LEEA's Board of 
Directors, which conducted all of LEEA's business and 
affairs, originally consisted of the five principals of HBKW, 
who were also the incorporators and officers of LEEA. In 
October 1982, four of the HBKW principals resigned-- 
although Karle remained as Chairman--and four new 
employer-member directors joined the Board. However, the 
bylaws, as amended in December 1982, provided that the 
four former directors, who remained officers of LEEA, would 
be "ex-officio members of the Board of Directors by virtue of 
the independent management functions which they perform 
for the Corporation . . . . The ex-officio members shall have 
equal standing and authority with the other members of the 
Board." LEEA Amended Bylaws, Art. VII, P 1, at A90. 
 
HBKW and LEEA entered into an Administrative 
Agreement on October 31, 1981, under which LEEA 
appointed HBKW the Administrative Agent of the LEEA 
Plan and Benefit Trust. Under the agreement, HBKW 
received fees from LEEA in exchange for HBKW's 
maintaining records and processing claims in connection 
with the LEEA Plans. LEEA business was conducted out of 
the offices of HBKW, and LEEA and HBKW had the same 
address. There was no separately designated office space 
for LEEA within the HBKW offices, and LEEA had no 
employees during most of its existence. 
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In 1985, LEEA became insolvent, and the Plan and Trust 
were terminated. This prompted employer-members and 
employee beneficiaries (and their dependents) of the LEEA 
Plan to file two suits against HBKW, HBKW's principals, 
and the officers and directors of LEEA. The complaints, 
which were consolidated in a single class action, alleged 
violations of fiduciary duty and other obligations under 
ERISA and state law breaches of contract, fiduciary duty, 
and duty of care. 
 
Appellants Western World Insurance Co. and Tudor 
Insurance Co. (collectively, "Western World") had issued 
directors' and officers' liability insurance policies to the 
officers and directors of LEEA. After the lawsuits were filed, 
Western World filed a declaratory judgment action seeking 
a declaration that it was not liable under those policies. It 
relied primarily on a policy exclusion for claims arising 
under ERISA.2 This declaratory judgment action was 
consolidated with the class action for all purposes. 
 
In response to a motion by Western World for summary 
judgment, the district court entered an order declaring that 
its ERISA policy exclusion was valid and that the policy did 
not, therefore, cover claims arising out of ERISA. The 
court's order did not, however, address whether any of the 
claims in the class suit were ERISA claims or whether 
Western World was liable with respect to any of those 
claims. Nonetheless, the court directed that the declaratory 
judgment action be closed and that the parties proceed 
with prosecuting the underlying actions. The district court 
certified the issue relating to the validity of the ERISA 
exclusion, the defendants appealed, and we affirmed the 
district court's decision. We expressly "assume[d] that the 
district court [would] now promptly address the overarching 
issue of the applicability of ERISA to the plans which are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The insurance policy contains two significant clauses. The first is 
contained in a section entitled "Exclusions" and states that the policy 
does not apply to claims "[a]rising out of [ERISA]." A465. The second is 
found on a separate page entitled "ERISA Liability Exclusion 
Endorsement," which provides: "It is understood and agreed that the 
coverage afforded under this policy shall not apply as respects liability 
imposed upon an insured (or which is imputed to an insured) under 
[ERISA]." A467. 
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the subject of the underlying actions against the directors." 
Western World Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hubbard, No. 96-3698, slip 
op. at 3 (3d Cir. July 16, 1993) (judgment order). 
 
On remand, Western World argued that the LEEA plan 
was an "employee welfare benefit plan" ("EWBP") within the 
meaning of ERISA.3 It also argued, in the alternative, that 
each member employer's individual plan was an EWBP 
within the meaning of ERISA. The district court granted 
partial summary judgment to the officers and directors of 
LEEA, holding that the LEEA plan was not an EWBP 
governed by ERISA because it was not "established or 
maintained by" an employer organization acting in the 
interests of its members. Over Western World's objection, 
the class action plaintiffs and defendants reached a 
settlement agreement. Western World appealed the district 
court's grant of partial summary judgment. We found that 
Western World's appeal was not moot, but dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction, explaining: 
 
       Absent a Rule 54(b) certification, an order is notfinal 
       and appealable as such unless it disposes of all claims 
       remaining before the court. Here we find no order 
       adjudicating Western World's claim which seeks a 
       declaratory judgment that "the Western World's policy 
       provides no coverage for and is not applicable to any 
       claim, demand, or cause of action arising from or 
       relating to the HBKW litigation." Where cases are 
       consolidated, a judgment on the claims in one 
       consolidated action is not an appealable final order if it 
       does not also adjudicate all claims in the other 
       consolidated action. 
 
Gruber v. Hubbard, Bert, Karle, Weber, Inc., No. 96-3277, 
slip op. at 16 (3d Cir. July 18, 1997) (not-for-publication 
opinion). We dismissed the appeal and requested that the 
court, "before entering a final order, provide an explanation 
for its apparent rejection of Western World's contention that 
each employer's individual plan constitutes an `employee 
welfare benefit plan' and, accordingly, that the class 
plaintiffs' claims, by operation of the doctrine of complete 
preemption, can only be ERISA claims." Id. at 17. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(1). 
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The district court responded to the jurisdictional defect 
by amending its May 6, 1994, order to deny Western 
World's motion for a declaratory judgment that it is not 
liable for any claims flowing from the HBKW litigation. It 
explained: 
 
       As the policies issued by Western World contain an 
       ERISA exclusion, the insurer is not liable for any 
       ERISA claims. However, we have determined that the 
       Plan does not fall within the scope of ERISA, and thus 
       non-ERISA claims, for which Western World may 
       indeed be liable, remain very much a part of this 
       action. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 3. The district court also responded to our 
request that it explain its apparent rejection of Western 
World's alternate line of argument. The court first 
acknowledged that "even where a multi-employer trust is 
not governed by ERISA, by subscribing to the trust, each 
individual employer may have established an individual 
ERISA plan." D. Ct. Op. at 5. The court then stated: 
 
        Western World points to no evidence, however, to 
       support its assertion that the individual plans at issue 
       here are ERISA plans. It states that "the individual 
       employers purchased health insurance for their 
       employees after joining LEEA and agreeing to 
       participate in the Trust. Although Western World 
       claims this is "powerful proof that ERISA governs the 
       individual plans," this assertion is contradicted by the 
       case law. A mere purchase of insurance, although 
       evidence that a plan may exist, is not in and of itself 
       proof that an ERISA plan does exist. 
 
        Western World points to no proof that the individual 
       employers even "purchased" health insurance. Western 
       World simply offers this Court no evidence from which 
       to conclude that the employer members of the LEEA 
       established individual benefit plans within the meaning 
       of ERISA. Accordingly, we will affirm our grant of 
       partial summary judgment . . . and hold that there are 
       no ERISA claims remaining in this litigation. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 5-6 (citations omitted). Western World appeals 
the district court's judgment. The class action plaintiffs are 
the appellees herein. 
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We must determine: first, whether the 
district court properly concluded that the LEEA plan was 
not an EWBP under ERISA; and, second, whether the court 
properly concluded that the individual employer-members 
of LEEA had not established single-employer EWBPs under 
ERISA. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant 
of partial summary judgment. See Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d 
Cir. 1993). "A motion for summary judgment shall be 
granted if the court determines `that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Id. (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
 
II. 
 
A. The LEEA Plan 
 
The statutory provisions that determine whether a multi- 
employer plan is governed by ERISA define an "employee 
welfare benefit plan" as: 
 
       any plan, fund, or program which was . . . established 
       or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
       organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, 
       fund or program was established or is maintained for 
       the purpose of providing for its participants or their 
       beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
       otherwise . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care 
       benefits. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1002(1). An "employer" includes "any person 
acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest 
of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and 
includes a group or association of employers acting for an 
employer in such capacity." Id. S 1002(5). The question we 
must resolve, then, is whether the LEEA Plan was 
"established or maintained" by "a group of employers" 
acting "indirectly in the interest of " its member employers 
in relation to the Plan. 
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Congressional commentary, Department of Labor (DOL) 
advisory opinions, and case law from other circuits 
applying ERISA to multi-employer plans have interpreted 
the statute to preclude ERISA coverage of plans established 
for entrepreneurial purposes. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1785, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1977) ("[P]lans . . . established 
and maintained by entrepreneurs for the purpose of 
marketing insurance products or services to others .. . are 
not established or maintained by the appropriate parties to 
confer ERISA jurisdiction, nor is the purpose for their 
establishment or maintenance appropriate to meet the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of the Act.");4 DOL Op. No. 81- 
7A, 1981 WL 17728, at *2 (E.R.I.S.A. Jan. 12, 1981) 
(stating that it is "the Department's position that an 
organization that functions as a vehicle for insurance 
entrepreneurs to market insurance products or services, 
not as a bona fide program to provide benefits to 
employees, is not an employee benefit plan within the 
meaning of ERISA"); MDPhysicians & Assoc., Inc. v. State 
Bd. of Ins., 957 F.2d 178, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
multi-employer plan sponsored by a physician's association 
was not an EWBP because association did not act 
"indirectly in the interest of" members; rather, it was an 
"entrepreneurial venture" that "acted for itself "). 
 
Giving effect to the intention to exclude entrepreneurial 
ventures, the cases and advisory opinions have imposed 
two broad requirements for a multi-employer plan to 
constitute an EWBP. First, the group of employers that 
establishes and maintains the plan must be a "bona fide" 
association of employers "tied by a common economic or 
representation interest, unrelated to the provision of 
benefits." Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Trust v. Iowa State Bd., 
804 F.2d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Moideen v. 
Gillespie, 55 F.3d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1995); 
MDPhysicians, 957 F.2d at 185-86; Credit Managers Ass'n 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This report has been described as " `virtually conclusive' as to 
legislative intent." MDPhysicians, 957 F.2d at 184; Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. 
Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D. Ariz. 1977); cf. Sioux Tribe v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 317, 329 (1942) (describing committee report "made 
within five years of its passage" as "virtually conclusive as to the 
significance of th[e] Act" discussed therein). 
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v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617, 625 
(9th Cir. 1987). Second, the employer-members of the 
organization that sponsors the plan must exercise control, 
either directly or indirectly, both in form and in substance, 
over the plan. See DOL Op. No. 96-25A, 1996 WL 634362, 
at *2-3 (E.R.I.S.A. Oct. 31, 1996) ("[I]t is the Department's 
view that the employers that participate in a benefit 
program must, either directly or indirectly, exercise control 
over the program, both in form and substance, to act as a 
bona fide employer group or association with respect to the 
program."). 
 
The district court stated that both of the above factors 
must be considered in determining whether an organization 
is acting in the interests of an employer. We agree. The 
commonality of interest requirement is well-established in 
the case law, and the control factor has been consistently 
advanced as a requirement in DOL advisory letters since 
the early 1980s. See, e.g., DOL Op. No. 83-48A, 1983 WL 
22533, at *3 (E.R.I.S.A. Sep. 14, 1983). In addition to the 
fact that "[t]he Department of Labor's construction of ERISA 
is entitled to a substantial measure of deference," 
International Ass'n of Entrepreneurs of Am. Benefit Trust v. 
Foster, 883 F. Supp. 1050, 1061 (E.D. Va. 1995), the 
control requirement is a reasonable means of ensuring that 
the administrators of multi-employer welfare benefit plans 
in fact act "in the interest of " their employer members. 
Therefore, we conclude that to qualify as an "employer" for 
ERISA purposes, an employer group or association must 
satisfy both the commonality of interest and control 
requirements. 
 
The district court found that the LEEA Plan satisfied 
neither of these requirements. It found that control was 
lacking because the employer members of the Plan's Board 
of Directors were outnumbered by HBKW principals with 
"ex officio" Board membership. Hence, the HBKW principals 
had the power to control the Board, and thus the power to 
control the Plan. Even though the ex-officio members never 
voted at meetings, the district court "assume[d] they would 
have exercised that power had the decisions of the board 
been contrary to their wishes." D. Ct. Op. (May 6, 1994) at 
7. The court also found commonality of interest to be 
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lacking because "there was no nexus among the individuals 
benefitted by the Plan and the entity providing those 
benefits, other than the Plan itself" since LEEA "was 
comprised of disparate and unaffiliated businesses" who 
had no relationship prior to the inception of the Plan. Id. at 
8. 
 
We find that the district court erred on the control issue 
but decided the common interests issue correctly. On 
summary judgment, it was inappropriate for the court to 
base its conclusion that the HBKW principals controlled the 
Board on an assumption that they would vote at Board 
meetings if they so desired. Moreover, viewed in the light 
most favorable to Western World, the non-moving party, 
there was evidence in the record to suggest that the LEEA 
employer members did indirectly control the administration 
of the Plan through their representation on the Board. For 
example, the minutes of the Board meetings indicate that 
the employer members of the Board discussed and voted on 
many aspects of the day-to-day administration of the Plan, 
including amendments to the LEEA Plan and rate 
adjustments, whereas the ex-officio members were only 
considered "guests" at those meetings. See, e.g., Minutes of 
4/25/83 Meeting, at A124. Hence, the court erred in 
concluding that the employer-members lacked control over 
the Plan as a matter of law. 
 
Nonetheless, Western World has not established the 
requisite commonality of interest to survive summary 
judgment. Courts considering the issue have found that a 
sufficient bond exists between employers engaged in the 
same line of business in the same geographical area, see, 
e.g., Steen v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 
904, 916 (9th Cir. 1997), but they have consistently 
rejected the contention that heterogenous businesses that 
share nothing more than a common size and a high regard 
for the "entrepreneurial spirit" enjoy such a bond, see, e.g., 
Moideen, 55 F.3d at 1481 (no commonality of interest 
where membership limited to employers with fewer than 
500 employees); International Assoc. of Entrepreneurs, 883 
F. Supp. at 1058-59 (no commonality of interest where 
membership limited to employers sharing "adherence to the 
principles of entrepreneurial spirit and free enterprise"). 
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The LEEA Plan bears greater resemblance to the latter 
types of organizations than the former. 
 
LEEA membership included such diverse groups as tool 
and die makers, an extended health care facility, a 
manufacturer of airplane engine parts, the operator of the 
local Holiday Inns, local law firms, a manufacturer of office 
partitions, a local realtor group, a manufacturer of knives, 
a beer distributor, an automobile dealer, and several social 
clubs. In short, the only common trait that LEEA employer- 
members possessed was that they employed fewer than 225 
employees. However, common size is not a bona fide 
organizational relationship. See Smith, 1997 WL 297096 at 
*4; Moideen, 55 F.3d at 1481. Accordingly, LEEA was not a 
"bona fide employer organization" that could establish and 
maintain an EWBP within the meaning of ERISA.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This conclusion is buttressed by consideration of the factors that the 
DOL has suggested are relevant to the factual determination of whether 
a group of employers participating in a multi-employer plan is a "bona 
fide employer association" within the meaning of S 1002(5). They include: 
 
       how members are solicited; who is entitled to participate and who 
       actually participates in the association; the process by which the 
       association was formed, the purposes for which it was formed, and 
       what, if any, were the preexisting relationships of its members; 
the 
       powers, rights, and privileges of employer members that exist by 
       reason of their status as employers; and who actually controls and 
       directs the activities and operations of the benefit program. 
 
DOL Op. No. 96-25A, 1996 WL 634362, at *3. 
 
Consideration of the first three factors is particularly instructive in 
this 
case. First, members of LEEA were solicited by salespeople working for 
HBKW who attempted to sell both participation in the LEEA Plan and 
other HBKW insurance products. See Karle Dep. of 5/22/86, at A723, 
729. Second, the restrictions placed on eligibility membership were few. 
Membership in LEEA was originally limited to employers with fewer than 
150 employees who did business in Northwestern Pennsylvania. 
However, membership was subsequently extended to employers with up 
to 225 employees and to those who did business in Northeastern Ohio. 
Additionally, the bylaws allowed the admission of"associate members" 
who did not satisfy the membership requirements. Third, there was no 
preexisting relationship between the employer members of LEEA, and 
solicitation of new members was based not on appeals to the shared 
interests of the organization, but on the sale by HBKW employees of 
participation in the Plan. Moreover, the organization was formed by a 
commercial organization that hoped to make a profit through the 
operation of the Plan. Id. at A728. 
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Therefore, the district court's entry of summary judgment 
with respect to the LEEA Plan was proper. 
 
B. The Individual Plans 
 
The Department of Labor holds the view that "if an 
employer adopts for its employees a program of benefits 
sponsored by a group or association that does not itself 
constitute an `employer' or an `employee organization,' such 
an employer or employee organization may have established 
a separate, single-employer (or single employee 
organization) employee benefit plan covered by Title I of 
ERISA." DOL Op. No. 96-25A, 1996 WL 634362, at *3. 
Western World argues that because the individual 
employers in this case established single-employer EWBPs, 
ERISA preempts the plaintiff class members' state law 
claims. 
 
Although plaintiff-appellees do not explicitly contest the 
DOL's position, they argue that it is irrelevant whether the 
individual plans constituted employee welfare benefit plans 
under ERISA. Appellees are incorrect. As we have 
previously indicated, if each employer's individual plan 
constituted an employee welfare benefit plan, then"the 
class plaintiffs' claims, by operation of the doctrine of 
complete preemption, can only be ERISA claims." Gruber v. 
HBKW, No. 96-3277, slip op. at 17 (3d Cir. July 18, 1997). 
 
Turning to the merits, we conclude that the district erred 
in granting summary judgment. "An employer . . . can 
establish an ERISA plan rather easily." Credit Managers 
Ass'n, 809 F.2d at 625. An ERISA plan exists if" `from the 
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can 
ascertain the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the 
source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.' " 
Deibler, 973 F.2d at 209. We have stated, moreover, that 
the crucial factor in determining whether a "plan" has been 
established is whether the employer has expressed an 
intention to provide benefits on a regular and long-term 
basis. Id. 
 
Although the district court correctly observed that an 
employer's mere purchase of health insurance for its 
employees "is not in and of itself proof that an ERISA plan 
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does exist," such a purchase does raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the existence of an ERISA plan. D. Ct. 
Op. at 6. "A number of courts have held that an employer's 
payment of insurance premiums, standing alone, is 
substantial evidence of the existence of an ERISA plan." 
Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(citing cases from Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits) (emphasis added). Even the district court itself 
conceded that a purchase of insurance is "evidence that a 
plan does exist." D. Ct. Op. at 6. 
 
The district court found, however, that Western World 
presented "no proof that the individual employers even 
`purchased' health insurance." D. Ct. Op. at 5-6. Appellee 
plaintiff class members, likewise, argue that the individual 
employers did not purchase insurance, that LEEA was not 
an insurer, and that the employers did not pay premiums 
to an insurer. Rather, "[t]hey made contributions to the 
LEEA trustee pursuant to the terms of the LEEA self- 
funded benefit trust. These contributions were pooled 
together in a trustee account and disbursed by the trustee 
to pay eligible medical expenses in accordance with the 
governing trust documents." Appellee's Br. at 15. This 
distinction is irrelevant, however. Since the crucial factor is 
"whether the employer has expressed an intention to 
provide benefits on a regular and long-term basis," Deibler, 
973 F.2d at 209, it does not matter whether the employer 
did so by "purchasing insurance" or by subscribing to a 
multi-employer trust. See also 29 U.S.C.S 1002 (employer 
establishes EWBP "through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise") (emphasis added). 
 
We conclude that Western World has raised a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the individual 
employer-members of LEEA established employee welfare 
benefit plans for ERISA purposes. As Western World 
argues, there was evidence that the individual employer 
plans satisfied the Deibler test for establishing an ERISA 
plan because each employee was given a copy of the 
summary plan description which indicated what benefits 
were available, which persons were eligible for coverage, the 
source of financing, and the procedures for receiving 
benefits. Moreover, it is clear that the individual employers 
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made contributions to the LEEA Plan on behalf of their 
employees. These contributions alone constituted sufficient 
evidence of the existence of an ERISA plan to survive 
summary judgment. 
 
The Ninth Circuit has explained why summary judgment 
is improper in this situation: 
 
       Even if an employer does no more than arrange for a 
       "group-type insurance program," it can establish an 
       ERISA plan, unless it is a mere advertiser who makes 
       no contributions on behalf of its employees. This 
       possibility should be explored in an appropriate 
       manner before summary judgment is employed. We 
       must remember that the existence of an ERISA plan is 
       a question of fact, to be answered in the light of all the 
       surrounding circumstances from the point of view of a 
       reasonable person. 
 
Credit Managers Ass'n, 809 F.2d at 625. In this case, the 
individual employers arranged for a "group-type insurance 
program" by participating in the LEEA Plan. They were not 
mere advertisers, but rather made contributions to the Plan 
on behalf of their employees. Therefore, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because we find that the district court properly 
concluded that the LEEA plan was not an employee welfare 
benefit plan under ERISA, we will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the class members on that 
issue. However, we hold that the court improperly granted 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the individual 
employer members of LEEA established single-employer 
employee welfare benefit plans under ERISA. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the district court will be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                17 
